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Programs based on tight fiscal and monetary policies (the ortho-
dox approach) are slow at reducing inflation in high-inflation
countries. Why? The policy-game approach sheds light on the
credibility problems that raise the public's infla,tionary  expecta-
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Kiguel  and Liviatan  used the policy-game  tactics,  the long-term  level of inflation  may  be
approach  to gain  insight  into a problem  that has  reduced  considerably.  Then they  are advised  to
puzzled analysts  of high inflation  economies.  limit the deviations  from  the preannounced
target of their nominal  anchor,  whether  a mone-
Why are programs  based  on tight fiscal  and  tary or exchange  rate.
monetary  policies  (the orthodox  approach)  slow
at reducing  inflation  in high-inflation  countries?  Another  problem  is how should  poli-
cymakers  who a.-e  genuinely  interested  in disin-
They conclude  that  lack of credibility  flation  react to adverse  public  expectations?  The
generates  disinflation  costs.  policyrnakers  are faced  with the dilemma  of
sticking  to their  announced  policy  and paying
One question  relates  to the apparent  delink-  immediate  costs in terms of unemployment  and
ing of inflation  from the long-term  requirements  capital  flight,  or compromising  their initial
of deficit  finance. Distinguishing  between  targets  at the cost of renewed  inflationary
regimes  of rule  and discretion,  Kiguel  and  expectations.
Liviatan  explain  that governments  that cannot
abide  by policy  rules and tend  to use surprise  If the source  of a credibility  problem  is the
inflation  in a discretionary  manner  to achieve  inability  of "weak"  policymakers  to honor  their
short-term  goals  - to erode  the real wage, for  commitment,  strong  policymakers  may  need to
example,  or the real value  of domestic  debt  - compromise  to some  extent.
raise  the rational  public's inflationary  expecta-
tions.  What  if the source  of a credibility  problem
lies in different  attitudes  of policymakers  toward
A given  level of real seigniorage,  in particu-  the relative  importance  of price stability  versus
lar, can correspond  to a much  higher  long-term  distortion  in the real sector  (overvaluation,
rate of inflation  - especially  in high-inflation  unemployment)  - and in the incentives  for
economies  with a limited  ability  to abide  by the  high-inflation  policymakers  to mimic  low-
rules.  The results are different in countries with  inflation policymakers? Then a case can be
a credible rule about money supply.  made for overadjusting in the initial stages of
adjustment - for example, creating a fiscal
If policymakers can convince the public that  surplus after a long history of deficits - to
(even though they intend to rely on money  improve the government's credibility.
finance) they will not resort to surprise inflation
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Recent  developments  in  the  application  of  game  theory  to  macroeconomics
can  offer  some  new  insights  into  the  nature  of  the  inflationary  process  in  high
inflation  economies  and shed new light on the difficulties  encountered  by
stabilization  policies  in this  environment. By 'high  inflation  economies"  we
mean the so called  chronic-inflation  countries,  where inflation  seems  to have
a life of its  own  quite  irrespective  of the  state  of the fiscal  deficit. In
these  economies,  such  as  Brazil  or Israel  before  1985,  it  was  usually  felt  that
Inflation  was well above the minimum level required  by considerations  of
seigniorage.  (In  fact  both  in  Brazil  and  Israel  the  long  term  rise  in  inflation
was  unrelated  to ,eigniorage.)
The  purpose  of  the  present  paper  is  two-fold.  First,  we  wish  to  present
some  of the  main ideas  of the  policy-game  approach  in a simple  manner  for  the
benefit  of readers  who are  less  familiar  with this  line  of  thinking. Secondly,
we intend  to  contribute  to  the  existing  literature  on  some  specific  topics  which
are  of special  relevance  to  high  inflation  economies.
One  of the  important  insights  provided  by the  recent  works  of Kydland  and
Prescott  (1977)  and  Barro  and  Gordon  (1983a)  relates  to  the  distinction  between
regimes  of  rules  and  discretion.  A government  which  cannot  abide  by  policy  rules
and  which  tends  to  use surprise-inflation  in  a  discretionary  manner  in  order  to
achieve  short-term  goals  will raise  inflationary  expectations  by the  rational
public. This  can  explain  how inflation  can  rise  above  the "fundamentals'  on a
long-term  basis. In  particular,  a  given  level  of  real  seigniorage  can  correspond
to a much higher long-term  rate of inflatior  in a discretionary  regime  as
compared  with a rules regime.  This issue is especially  relevant  for high
inflation  economies  where  the  ability  to abide  by rules  is often  limited.2
It is often  puzzling  how is it possible  for  inflation  to go up on a
longer-term  basis  with the  fiscal  deficit  changing  in the opposite  direction.
a phenomenon  which  has  been  observed  recently  in Brazil  and  Mexico [see  Kiguel
and  Liviatan  (1988)]. It is  equally  puzzling  to find  that  inflation  can  rise,
for  many  years.  above  the  estimated  revenue  maximizing  point,  as  was found  for
the  case  of Israel  by  Liviatan  and  Piterman  (1986).
Conventional  inflation-tax  theory  has no answers to this type of
phenomena. Recently  Bruno  and Fischer  (1986)  provided  an analysis  of stable
high-inflation  equilibrium  which  can  help  in  understanding  the  foregoing  features
of inflation.  The  policy  game  approach  can  provide  an alternative,  and  in some
ways less  arbitrary,  framework  of dealing  with  these  issues.
A  basic  idea  in  the  latter  approach  is  that  a  given  need  for  seigniorage
can generate  a much higher  long-term  inflation  level  if the government  uses
surprise-inflition  tactics  as  compared  with  the  case  where  it  can  commit  itself
to  a credible  money  supply  rule. The  inclination  to  use  the  former  tactics  may
often  be explained  by political  instability  which is reflected  in high time
preference  or short  planning  horizon  by  policy  makers. In  the  present  paper  we
make use of a somewhat  modified  version  of Barro (1983)  to elaborate  on the
issue  of  high inflation  equilibrium.
The  increase  of inflation  above  the  revenue  maximizing  point  can  also
be  driven  by the  existence  of  non-fiscal  motivations  for  inflationary  policies.
For  example,  the  policy  makers  may  have  a  motivation  to erode  the  real  wage by
surprise-inflation  tactics in order to increase  employment  or  to improve
competitiveness. The policy  game approach  may explain  how these short-term
tactics  can lead  to a long-term  increase  of inflation,  even above  the revenue3
maximizing  point,  because  of the  adverse  effects  on inflationary  expectations.
In  the  present  paper  we shalh  formalize  this  interaction  between  fiscal  and  non-
fiscal  motivations  for  inflation  by  combining  different  elements  from  the  works
of Barro  and  Gordon.
A basic feature  of the  policy  game  approach  is that,  in equilibrium,
the  policy  maker  cannot  achieve  any  real  gains  from  surprise  inflation  because
of  the  public's  correct  anticipation.  This  creates  a  strong  motivation  for  the
policy  maker to reach some sort of a "social  pact" in order to break the
inflationary  spiral, a  strategy  which is often employed in income-policy
supported  stabilization.
This  brings  us  to the  second  major  topic  of  the  paper  which  is  related
to  the  credibility  issues  which  arise  in  stabilization  programs  in  high  inflation
countries.  While  quite  often  stabilization  programs  fail  because  of  insufficient
adjustment  of the  fundamentals,  yet  the  empirical  evidence  suggests  that  this
is  not  the  whole  story. For  example,  the  disinflation  policy  by  means  of  pegging
the exchange  rate in Chile  in 1979-81  led  to a balance  of payments  crisis  in
spite  of the  fact  that  the  fiscal  deficit  was turned  into  a surplus  (see  Ramos
(1986)]. In Israel's  1985 stabilization,  a policy  of using  the  exchange  rate
as  nominal  anchor  jointly  with  a  major  fiscal  adjustment  were  not  sufficient  to
prevent  excessive  increases  in real  wages and overvaluation. It seems  that
these  developments  were  in  part  due  to  credibility  coniiderations  regarding  the
determination  of the  policy  makers  to pursue  the  announced  nominal  policies.
The  policy  game  approach  may  provide  some  insight  into  the  way  in  which
lack of credibility  may generate  disinflation  costs.  We shall pursue  this
subject  by  making  use  of Barro's  (1986)  seminal  paper  on  monetary  policy  under
incomplete  information.  However,  this  paper  and  the  related  literature  do  not4
explain  how a policy  maker  who is genuinely  interested  in disinflation  should
react  to  adverse  expectations.  This  issue  is  of great  practical  importance  in
concrete  stabilizations  wh,ere  the policy  maker is faced  with the  dilemma  of
sticking  to his announced  policy and paying immediate  costs in terms of
unemployment  and  capital  flight  or  compromising  his  initial  targets  at  the  cost
of renewed  inflationary  expectations.  In  order  to analyze  this issue  we shall
modify  Barro's  model  along  the  lines  of  a  recent  paper  by  Cukierman  and  Liviatan
(1989).
We shall  finally  address  another  issue  which  arises  often  in  planning
stabilizations  strategies.  It is usually  claijsed  that in order to enhance
initial  credibility,  and  underscore  the  change  of  regime,  the  policy  maker  should
overadjust  in  the  initial  stage. For  example,  it  may  be advisable  to  create  a
fiscal  surplus  after a long history of deficits.  We shall show that the
considerations  involved  in  this  approach  can  be  formulated  in  terms  of  signalling
theory. Here  we shall  introduce  some  modifications  in  a recent  model  by  Vickers
(1986)  who  uses  the  basic  Barro-Gordon  framework,  in  order  to discuss  the  pros
and cons of overadjustment. We shall conclude  with some comments  on the
interaction  between two important  principles  mentioned above --  one is the  need
to compromise  with adverse  expectations  and the other is the incentive  to
overadjust  in  order  to enhance  credibility.
This  paper  is  divided  into  two  parts. Part  I  deals  with explanations
of high inflation  (in  excess  of seigniorage  requirements)  and Part  II focuses
on issues  of stabilization  and  credibility.5
PART  I:  EXPLANATIONS  OF HIGH  INFLATION
1.  BASIC  ASPECTS  OF POLICY  GAMES
The  basic  ideas  of  the  policy  games  approach  can  be illustrated  by  means
of  a simple  model  used  in  the  works  of  Barro  and  Gordon. Let  the  policy  maker's
utility  function  be given  by
U  - -(a/2)X2 +  b(_Fre) ;  a,b >  0  (1)
where X  and re denote  actual  and expected  inflation. This assumes  that the
policy  maker is averse  to r  while  he benefits  from  surprise  inflation. It we
interpret  we  as the  rate  of increase  in  nominal  wages,  then  an  excess  of  X  over
re  reflects  a  reduction  in  real  wages  and  an increase  in  employment.  The  latter
may be desirable  if unemployment  is too low due to excessive  unemployment
insurance  and  the  like  (Barro  1983  ).
Suppose  that the policy  maker determines  I  through  various policy
instruments  such  as  the  money  supply  or  the  exchange  rate. Suppose  further  that
re (as  reflected  in  the  setting  of  nominal  wages)  is  datermined  in  the  beginning
of the  period  as the  first  step  in  the  game. Then  the  policy  maker  will set  I
so  as to  maximize  U,  which  yields
*=  b/a  (2)
as the  government's  policy  function.
If  we  iume  full  information,  so that  U is  known  to  the  public,  then6
it  will  set  we  equal  to  expected  t*  which  yields,  under  certainty,  re  - 1*.  This
implies  that in equilibrium  surprise  inflation  is zero.  Thus  with a rational
public  the  policy  maker  does  not  achieve  its  employment  goal  and  in  addition  pays
the  cost  of a  high  I.
It  is  evident  that  under  these  conditions  the  policy  maker  is  interested
in making  a commitment  not to inflate  since  he cannot  obtain  his employment
objective  anyway. However,  while  this  is  true  ex-ante,  the  policy  maker  has  an
incentive  to inflate  ex-post. This  is so  since  given  r  in (2)  is optimal. It
is  because  of this  dynamic  inconsistency  that  the  policy  maker's  commitment  may
not  be credible.
We may dstinguish two types  of regimes  according  to the ability  of
the policy maker to make credible  commitmen*.s. At  one extreme is the
*discretionary  regime"  where the policy  maker is not capable  of making  any
credible  commitment,  which  leads  to  the  policy  of (2). At the  other  extreme  is
the "ideal-rules's  regime"  where  he is capable  of fully  credible  commitments.
In  the  latter  case,  the  policy  maker's  inflation  target  is  translated  fully  into
the  public's  expectations  so that  the  maximization  of  U is  carried  out  subject
to  = ire,  which  yields  an optimal  policy  of  r  - 0 (for  further  discussion,  see
Barro  and  Gordon  1983a).
What is it that  determines  the  ability  to  make credible  commitments?
We  may  mention  such  factors  as  past  experience  in  keeping  commitments,  the  policy
maker's  political  horizon,  his  rate  of  discounting  the  future  and  so  on. In  some
models  (Barro  and  Gordon(1983a)]  these  considerations  induce  the  policy  makers
to  adopt  an inflation  target  between  zero  and  the  discretionary  solution  (b/a).
A most  important  aspect  of the  game  relates  to the  kind  of information
that  the  public  possesses  about  the  nature  of  the  policy  maker. Quite  often  the7
public  has only  incomplete  information  about  the  policy  maker,  as reflected  in
his  ability  to  carry  out  his  commitments.  Under  these  conditions  it  is  no longer
true that surprise  inflation  is eliminated  in equilibrium  (in  finite  horizon
models).  In particular,  the possibility  of negative  surprise  inflation  may
explain  various  side-effects  which  accompany,  ordinarily,  stabilization  programs
- such  as overvaluation,  high real  wages  and  high export  real  interest  rates.
We shall  accordingly  introduce  considerations  of incomplete  information  in  the
discussion  of stabilization  policies. However  in Part  I  we shall  assume  full
information.
2.  THE HIGH  INFLATION  EQUILIBRIUM
The feeling  that inflation  may deviate  from  the  fundamentals  even in
the  long  run  has  found  its  formal  expression  in recent  research. Bruno (1986)
and  Fischer  and Bruno  (1987)  analyze  this  issue  in the  conventional  framework
of  the  inflation  tax  model  with  two  steady  state  equilibria  at  each  level  of the
fiscal  deficit  - one  above  and  one  below  the  revenue  maximizing  point.  It is
shown  that  under  myopic  rational  expectations,  or under  adaptive  expectations
with quick  adjustment,  the  high inflation  equilibrium  can  be stable.
A completely  different  approach  to  this  issue  (which  does  not rely  on
the  foregoing  assumptions)  can  be formulated  in  terms  of  policy  games. For  this
purpose  we shall  use a somewhat  modified  version  of Barro's  (1983)  paper  on
inflationary  finance.
The  seigniorage  in the  inflation  tax  model  is  given  by
Ht  -mt-1  Mt  mt-1  pt-( S  - (_  _ 8
t  P  P  P  Pt
t  t  t-1l
where  Mt and  Pt denote  the  nominal  money  stock  and  the  price  level  in  period  t.
Inflation  and  expected  inflation  in  period  t  are  definsd  as
P  -P  _e  -P Jr  t  t-1  e  t+l  t
t  Pt_.  t+l  Pt
where  ret+ 1 is  based  on the  information  set  of t.  The  demand  function  for  real
balances  in  period  t is given  by L(ret+l). Assuming  that.  the  money  market  is
always  in  equilibrium  and  usirg  the  approximation  (l1+)-l-l-r  we  may  rewrite  (3)
as
St - L (ret+,)  - L(ret)  (l-rt)  (4)
Let  us consider  first  the  discretionary  regime. Here  reti1  is  assumed
to  be unaffected  by a change  in  monetary  growth  which  affects  ft.  For  a fixed
real  interest  rate,  ret+,  can  be regarded  as representing  the  nominal  interest
rate.  In view of this interpretation,  the  policy  maker in the discretionary
regime  assumes  that  when  he increases  Mt.  the  money  market  will  be equilibrated
by a proportional  increase  in Pt, rather  than  by a reduction  in the interest
rate,  as  can  be seen  from  Mt - L(Te,,)Pt.1
We may treat  this situ#  ... on as one where the  nominal  interest  rate
(ret+l)  is  determined first with  Mt  being  set  immediately  after  that.9
Alternatively,  we  may  retard  prior  announcemento  of  Mt  as  not  being  credible  and
therefore  incapable  of affecting  expectations.  The latter  will be determined
on the basis  of the public's  assessment  of the government  intentions,  as in
Section  2.
Following  Barro (1983),  we express  the  government's  utility  function
for  period  t  as
Ut ' °tSt - #Ort)  - Ir(Wet+l)  ;  t>  °  (5)
where  v  represents  the  utlity from  seigniorage  while  0 and  r  are  functions  which
represent  the loss from actual  and expected 2 inflation. Here St increases
utility  because  it is assumed  to reduce  the  need for  distortionary  taxation.
The  distortionary  effects  of  inflation  itself  are  expressed  through  the  functions
r and r. Although  the  poiicy  maker  is  assumed  to  maximize  a sum  of  discounted
utilities,  the problem  can be reduced (in the discretionary  regime)  to the
maximization  of  each  Ut  separately.  The  maximization  is  carried  out  with  respect
to st  for  given  values  of ret+ 1 and  wet (the  latter  is  predetermined).
The first  order  conditions  yield
GtL(ret)  - '(rt) =  °  (6)
Solving  for  it  we obtain  the  policy  function
F  =  J  (1  to)  (7) Let  u8ass  t
Let us assume that Ot  is a constant  equal to 9  Assuming full10
information  about  the  government's  objective  function  and  about  L(.),  rational
expectations  require  that
ret O T*t;  all t  (8)
Noting  that  - '*t,  we see  that (7)  and (8)  can determine  a steady
state  equilibrium  for  r.  It is  plausible  that  when  9 is large,  we may obtain
a long  term  solution  for  r  above  the  revenue  maximizing  point  (this  possibility
is also  suggested  briefly  in  Barro's  op.cit.  p. 12).
To see  thif,  note  that  in steady  states  (6)  implies
4  ,  ?'(f)  - F  (f)
L (I)
where F will be increasing  in r  if O"  >  0 (the latter  is implied  in Barro
op.cit). So,  in  general,  it is  possible  to  raise  X  in  steady  states  by raising
S.  There  is,  in fact,  no restriction  which  prevents  r  from rising  above  the
revenue  maximizing  point  (where  the  elasticity  of  L is  greater  than  unity).
We may illustrate  this case,  in a different  manner,  by drawing  the
seigniorage  curve in  the  (S,r) plane for steady state conditions  where
t  eret+l=jt=ir  in which case St=Su-L(r). The normal  shape  of this curve is
represented  by SS in  Figure  1. However,  in  the  discretionary  regime  we have  to
consider  the  relation  between  St  and rt  given  ret  and  ret+ 1,  which  yields
S/  r=L(r). The  latter  is  positive  even  in the  downward  sloping  portion  of SS,
as is illustrated  by the  BB lines.11
The  slope  of  the  indifference  curve  between  St  and rt  for  a  fixed  Iret+
is  given  by  #'I9. A steady  state  equilibrium  under  the  discretionary  regime  may
be  obtained  beyond  the  revenue  maximizing  point  as  is  illustrated  by  the  tangency
point  V.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  under  the  discretionary  regime  the  policy
maker  aims  only  at the  erosion  of  the  public's  real  balance  L(ret)  without  being
constrained  by the  possible  effect  of Ft on L(ret+l). This  may explain  why  we
may  find  that  empirical  demand  functions  for  money  in  high inflation  countries
imply  an elasticity  greater  than  unity  (see  Liviatan  and  Piterman  op.cit.).
Since  the point  V moves to the right  along  SS when 9 increases,  we
obtain  the  paradoxical  result  that  an increase  in the  need for  seigniorage  may
result  in  an actual  reduction  in seigniorage  collection,  a phenomenon  to  which
we referred  in the  introduction.
The fact  that  the  policy  maker  determines  ft for  a given  ret implies
that  he retains  the option  of creating  surprise  inflation. Under the rules
regime  the  policy  maker  relinquishes  this  option  and  sets  a rule  in  the  form  of
(say)  a  constant  inflation  target  irr We assume  tikat  under  the  rules  regime  the
policy  maker's commitments  are credible  and incorporated  immediately  in the
public's  expectations.
Suppose  tentatively  that the  economy  is in a long  run  equilibrium  in
the rules  regime,  beyond  the revenue  maximizing  point.  If the policy  maker
announced  a  permanent  reduction  of  1r as  of  next  period,  then  he  will  raise  his
permanent  flow  of seigniorage  and in addition  benefit  from an initial  stock
adjustment  in  real  balance  which  will  raise  his  revenues  in  the  initial  period.
Therefore  we cannot  expect  to find  a high-inflation  equilibrium  (i.e.  one  on
the  inefficient  segment  of the  Laffer  curve)  under  the  rules  regime.12
3.  THE EMPLOYMENT  WEDGE  AND MONETARY  ACCO)Q(ODATION
The  fiscal  needs are not the  only motivation  for creating  surprise
inflation. We have seen in Section  1 that the policy  maker is motivated  to
create  surprise  inflation  in order  to increase  employment  (or  to improve  the
balance  of payments  by increasing  competitiveness).  Let us  now introduce  the
employment  target  explicitly  (as  in  Barro  and  Gordon  1983b)  and  combine  it  with
the  analysis  of the  preceding  section.
Let  unemployment  be given  by
v  =  vN  - a( 1 -1e)  (9)
where  vN is the  natural  rate  of unemployment.  The latter  is considered  to  be
too  high  by  a policy  maker  who  has  an  unemployment  target  of  vG<vN. Let  us now
extend  the  policy  maker's  utility  function  (5)  to  include  the  employment  motive  -
U  =  Q-(b/2)(v-vG) 2 =  Q-(b/2)[-a(r-re)+D]2  (10)
where  Q  is the  utility  function  in (5)  and  D=vN-vG>O.
The  first  order  conditions  in the  discretionary  regime  imply
(8U)/(8r)/re,je+l  =  (8Q)/(8r)+ba[a(r-re)+D]  =  0  (11)
(,e+l =  ,et+l).  In equilibrium r=re  so that (8Q)/(8f) =  -baD<O.  The policy
maker  will  thus  try  to  push  X  further  than  before 3 (where  we  had  8Q/81r=o).  This
makes it  more likely  for r  to exceed  the  revenue  maximizing  point,  leading  to
a high inflation  equilibrium. 4 By contrast,  in the rules  regime,  the  policy13
maker gives up the option  of pu.rsuing  the employment  target so that this
additional  incentive  for  inflation  is  not operative.
Suppose  now  that  D represents  the  difference  between  the  government's
and  the  union's  targets  of  employment  in  the  tradables  sector. Suppose  further
that  as a result  of a deterioration  of the  external  position  the government's
employment  target  increases  more  than  that  of  the  unicns',  so  that  D  rises. This
will  raise  the  government's  incentive  to  inflate,  as  can  be  seen  from  (11),  which
will reduce  real  wages  on impact,  before  the  change  in  D is  incorporated  in  we.
However  after  that,  employment  will  be determined  by the  union's  target  while
inflation  will remain  higher.  The level of seigniorage  may rise or fall
depending  on the initial  position  on the demand  curve for  money.  This may
explain  how a permanent  negative  external  shock  may raise  inflation  on a long-
term  basis  in a discretionary  regime.
PART  II: STABILIZATION  POLICIES
1.  COMMITMENTS  AND CREDIBILITY
The foregoing  discussion  showed  that the  ability  to make a credible
commitment  can  by itself  reduce  inflation  dramatically.  A new  policy  maker  who
feels  that  he is  capable  of  committing  himself  to  a  low  inflation  rule  will then
be induced  to impress  the  public  with  the  seriousness  of  his  commitment.
One  way of signalling  the  policy  maker's  commitment  is by announcing
a fixed exchange  rate regime  backed  by a commitment  for supporting  fiscal
policies.  However,  since  there is usually  no effective  way to enforce  this
commitment,  it  may  not  be credible.
Another  phenomenon  which  we observe  in stabilization  programs  is the
attempt to  reach a  social  pact  involving the  government, labor unions and14
employers,  whereby  each  party  is  bound  to refrain  from  using  its  nominal  policy
instruments  unilaterally  (for  example,  the  government  may freeze  the  exchange
rate, labor  may refrain  from nominal  wage demands  and employers  may freeze
prices).  We may view this as a way of performing  a transition  from the
inflationary  trap  inherent  in the  discretionary  regime  to a rules  regime  which
is backed  by credible  commitments. However,  experience  shows  that the  basic
conflicts  of interest  between  the  parties  to the  pact render  this  solution  to
be of a temporary  nature.
If the government  pursues  stabilization  policies  which  are  not fully
credible,  then  inflationary  expectations  will rise  above  the  actual  inflation
level. This  will cause  excessively  high real  wages  and  a correspondingly  low
real  exchange  rate. It  will  also  cause  high  real  interest  rates  which  lead  to
financial  crises in the private sector.  A  policy  maker who  faces these
undesirable  side-effects  of stabilization  may compromise  his inflation  targets
to reduce  social  costs  (as  we shall  show  below).
2.  CONMIMNENTS  UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION
A  stabilization  program  may not  be credible  because  it appears  to be
internally  inconsistent  (such  as  one  involving  a  fixed  exchange  rate  and  a  large
fiscal  deficit).  This  is  conceptually  a  trivial  case  which  we shall  not  pursue.
A more difficult  issue of credibility  arises in relation  to stabilization
programs  which  seem  to  be  consistent  with low  inflation  in  the  present  but  which
raise  some  question  marks  about  the  future  course. Lack of credibility  will
arise  if the  public  suspects  that  the  policy  maker  has  a motivation  to renege
in  the  future  on  his  commitment.  This  issue  cannot  arise  under  full  information
since then the public  knows exactly  how the  policy  maker  will behave  in the15
future.  It  follows  that  this  type  of  problem  should  be  analyzed  in  the  framework
of incomplete  information,  which  is the  course  we shall  pursue.
The formal  analysis  of the forgoing  problem  involves  the following
issues. What is  the  possible  motivation  of  a policy  maker  to  cheat? How is  it
possible  for  hini  to  conceal  his  intentions?  How  does  the  degree  of credibility
affect  the  policies  of  the  cheating  policy  maker? What  does  lack  of  credibility
imply  for the  bonest  policy  maker?  Can the latter  pursue  policies  which  may
remove  the  uncertainty  about  his intentions?
3.  IMPLICATIONS  OF  BARRO'S MODEL  OF  INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
We  may  use  the  important  paper  by  Barro  (1986)  on  incomplete  information
as a  starting  point for dealing  with the foregoing  questions.  Here the
credibility  issue  is  modelled  through  uncertainty  about  the  type  of the  policy
maker. There  are  two  types  - one  who is  always  true  to  his  commitment  (denoted
S  for  "strong")  and  one  who  is  incapable  of  honorit.g  his  commitments  but  may  have
an  incentive  to  mimic  S temporarily  if  this  is  justified  ex-post  (we  denote  the
second  type  by  W for  'weak").  The  public  is  uncertain  about  the  identity  of the
type  in  office  and  assigns  an initial  probability  (a1)  that  the  policy  maker  is
S.  The  duration  of the  game is fixed  at T periods. 5 The  utility  function  of
both  policy  makers  for  each  period  is  of the  form  given  by (1)  in  Part I.
In  this  model  S,  who  can  overcome  the  problem  of  dynamic  inconsistency,
announces  a rule  1=0  to  which  he adheres  ex-post. If  the  policy  maker  happels
to  be S  and  is  believed  to  be such,  then  the  rule  will  give  him  a  better  outcome
than  the  discretionary  strategy  of setting  r=b/a  for  all  periods  (t).
The  policy  maker  W  will  certainly  adopt  the  discretionary  strategy  for
the last  period  (T)  since  he is  not bound  by any  commitment. However,  in the16
multiperiods  case,  W may have  an incentive  to  mimic  S for  a number  of periods
(instead  of  being  revealed  immediately)  because  then  he  may  benefit  from  a span
of  low  inflation  levels  (i.e.  f-0).  If  the  policy  maker  deviates  from  the  rule
just  once,  he is  revealed  to  be  W for  the  rest  of the  game.
If  T  is  sufficiently  long,  there will  be  in  equilibri'im  two
qualitatively  different  intervals  - in  the  first  interval,  (l,Z-l),  W  will  mimic
S and  set  1=0,  and  in  the  second  interval,  (Z,T-1),  W  will  randomize  his  policy
setting  r=(b/a)  with probability  Pt and  r=0  with 1-Pt. In the  first  interval.
the "reputation'  paramater  at  remains  constant  while  in  the  second  interval  at
is updated  according  to Bayes'  formula  at+l=atat+(lat)Pt]-1 provided  1=0 up
to period  t.  In the  second  interval,  at+, is increasing  and  Pt is decreasing
as long  as  ft=°,  while in  the  first  one  at=al  and  Pt-l  in each  period.
The intuition  behind  these  results  is that  when the  planning  horizon
of  the  policy  maker  is  long  W has  a strong  incentive  to  mimic  S  because  this  may
give  him  many  periods  of  low  inflationary  expectations  while  still  retaining  the
option  of cheating  in the  end. During  this  interval  the  public  knows  that  both
policy  makers  choose  r =  0, hence  no new information  is  gained  about  the type
of the  policy  maker  by observing  this  policy. Therefore,  at  remains  constant.
When  the  game  draws  nearer  to its  end  W finds  that  the  gain  from  having
low inflation  just  balances  the advantage  from  cheating  today,  so he becomes
indifferent  whether  to  set  X  =  0  or  f  =  b/a  in  which  case  W is  revealed. Since
W is indifferent  between  the  policies  he is also  willing  to randomize  between
them as stated  above.  In the type of equilibrium  defined  for this game (a
"sequential'  equilibrium)  there is a definite  path for Pt which is common
knowledge.  Suppose  that in a given  period  t (with  Pt <  1) the  outcome  is a
decision  not to inflate. Since  the  public  knows  that r  - b/a  was a possible17
outcome,  and  yet in practice  he observed  r - 0, he will find  it reasonable  to
raise  his subjective  probability  that the policy  maker is S.  This is the
intuition  of the  updating  formula.
The  model  has  some  important  implications  for  stabilization  policies.
Note first  that  inflationary  expectations  are  given  by
,et  =  (1-at)(1-Pt)(b/a)  (21)
which  is  derived  from  the  fact  that  re  is  a  weighted  average  between  ft  =  0 (with
probability  at)  and (1-Pt)(b/a)  with probability  1 - at.  The  expression
(1  - Pt)(b/a)  is  the  expected  value  of Ft conditional  on the  policy  maker  being
W.
It follows  from (21) that in the first  interval t=,e  t=O.  In this
interval,  the  policy  maker,  of  any  type,  does  not  encounter  any  costs  resulting
from  negative  surprise  inflation.  The  length  of  this  interval  depends  positively
on T, a, and on the  policy  maker's  discount  rate  6  (all  these  parameters  are
common  knowledge). Thus,  in the  beginning,  the  policy  will enjoy  a "period  of
grace". For example,  if the rule  1=0  takes  the  form  of a fixed  exchange  rate
policy,  then  in  the  beginning  the  policy  will  be fully  credible  if  the  foregoing
parameters  are favorable. Since  high  values  of T and 6can be interpreted  as
indicating  political stability,  the model  implies that under the  latter
conditions  the  costs  of disinflation  will  be relatively  low.
As the  program  approaches  the  end of the  policy  maker's  horizon,  the
system  enters  the  second  phase  where  Pt starts  to decline  (note  that  PT=O)  and
at starts  to rise.  In view of (21).  fe becomes  positive6  and S has to incur18
the  cost of negative  surprise  inflation  (r-re)  till the  end of the  program. 7
Of  course,  if  the  duration  of  the  game  is  short,  and/or  a,  and  6  are  small,  there
may  not  be  a  mimicking  phase  at all  so that  the  hardships  for  S  will  begin  with
the  first  period.  This  will not change  the  policy  chosen  by S, but it will
involve  the  phenomena  of excessively  high real  wages,  unemployment  and so  on,
right  from  the  start.
4.  CREDIBILITY,  ACCOMMODATION  AND  COMPROMISE
One  of  the  shortcomings  of  Barro's analysis for  the  study of
stabilization  programs  is  that  S,  while  being  honest,  is  not  realistic.  By this
we  mean  that  he does  not  modify  his  policies  in  the  face  of  adverse  expectations.
More specifically,  Barro's  model  provides  an optimal  policy  for  W but  not for
S,  who sticks  arbitrarily  to the rule  1=0.  (This  issue  is investigated  fully
in  Cukierman  and  Liviatan  (1989).]
This assertion  can be easily  verified  by the fact that for  the last
period  (T),  it is  not  optimal  for  S to  announce  r=0. Suppose  that  S  is free  to
announ.e  any  policy  rule  for  T, say  r*T,  which  he is  bound  to  carry  out. If  the
public  were  in fact  certain  that  the  policy  maker  is  S,  then  it  would  be  optimal
for  him  to  set  1*T=O  We  know,  however,  that  there  is  a  probability  of  1-aT  that
the  policy  maker  is  W, who  will set rT=b/a. Moreover,  it is optimal  for  W to
mimic the  announcement  of S since  it is costless  and  it enables  him to reduce
re  T .
Suppose  that  rT  is the  optimal  announcement  by S.  Then  the  public's
expectations  will be determined  by
e =
,T - T  'T +(1-aT)  a  ;B  bla.19
Assuming  that  CT  <  L  (as  we shall.  show  later)  '.t  is  easily  verified  that
if  W is in  office  he  will prefer  to announce T and  then  actually  to set20
It  8  B, rather  than  both  announce  and  set 1T - 8  (in  the  latter  case
r-  B).
Now  how  will S  determine  IT? Since  W will  always  mimic  the
optimal  announcement  of  S  we  may  take  it,  as  an  off-equilibrium  assumption,  that
S considers  any  announcement  that  he  makes  as  entering  re  with  a weight  of aT.
The  residual  weight,  1 - a  , will  be attached  to the  possibility  that  the
same  announcement  is  made  by  W who  will in  practice  play  1T  13. Hence  S
acts  on the  assumption  that
fT  QT XT  (1-  a)B  (22)
where rT  is the  off  equilibrium  c-,mmitment  by S.  Since  S is  bound  by
his commitment we also have
IT =T  (23)
where  1T is the  actual  r  set  by S.  Substituting  (22)  and (23)  in the
utility  function  (1)  and  maximizing  with respect  to  1T we obtain  8
*~~~~~~~~~~~~~
T  (l  - aT)  a  (24)
It is  only  when S is fully  credible  (aT  - 1) that  he  will follow
Barro's  rule  and  announce  VT =  0.  The  lower  his  credibility,  or
reputation,  as  measured  by aTo  the  more  will  he tend  to compromise
with  W's  optimal  policy.21
The  need  of S to compromise  can  be further  clarified  by
considering  the  surprise-inflation  element  for  S,  which  is given  by
T  T  T  'T  '  (  a  T) (fT  - B)  (25)
If S sets  -T  - 0 then  surprise  inflation  is -(1  - a.)  Bw hich diminishes
his  utility  (implying,  say,  a rise  in real  wages  and  an increase  in
unemployment).  If,  in this  situation,  he raises 4T  by 12,  then  his
utility  loss  will be cut  by b(l - aT)  while  his  loss  from  the  increase
in inflation  will  be negligible  (the  derivative  of -(a/2)r2  at 1  0
is  zero]. As uT increases  the  latter  loss  becomes  more substantial  ti'.
*
S  reaches  his optimum  at arT  = b(l-aT),  which  is  just (24).
It is shown  in Cukierman  and Liviatan  (1989)  that the need of S to
compromise  carries  over  to  the  multiperiod  case  for  a  certain  range  of  parameters
6  and  a1 (the  latter  denotes  initial  reputation).  In general,  there  are  three
types  of  behavior  of  W in  periods  prior  to  T - setting  rt=l*t  with  probability
1  (i.e. mimicking),  setting r  =V*t with probability  O<Pt<l and  (B) with
probability  1-Pt  (i.e.  randomizing),  aad  setting  rt=B  with  probability  one  (with
W revealing  himself). The  general  expression  for  K*t  set  by S is
r*t=(l-pt)(1-at)(B)  where  at is the  value  of reputation  in period  t.  In the
randomization  range,  Pt and  at are fractions  so  that  r*tO°
Let us apply these ideas to a two period  model.  The third case
mentioned  above is called  a  "separating  equilibrium"  since the public can
identify  the types  in the first  period.  In this case there is no surprise
inflation  in the  second  period  so that  S will set  v2 = °,  while in the first
period  11 will be set  by S,  at (1  - a,)  B.  The  case  of  mimicking  's  called  a22
"pooling  equilibrium"  in  which  there  is  no  surprise  inflation  in  the  first  period
(since  the  public  expects  both  types  to  act  identically).  In this  case  S  will
adopt  a strategy  71 = 0 and  12 - tl  - a,)  B.  The  randomizing  case  occurs  when
W is  indifferent  between  revealing  himself  in  the  first  period  or in  the  second
one.
Which regime  will actually  apply  depends  on the relation  of initial
reputation  (a,)  and the time preference  discount  factor  6  (6 multiplies  the
second  periods  utility). It is shown  in  Cukierman  and  Liviatan  (1989)  that  we
shall  have  a separating  equilibrium  when  5  <  (a2/2). This is  explained  by the
consideration  that  when  the  future  is  heavily  discounted,  W  will have  a strong
incentive  to reap  the  gains  from  surprise  inflation  in  the  present,  and  thus  be
revealed. In this  case  the  strategy  of S  will  be to set  J1r  =  (1  - 1)  B  and
12 =  0.  When  6  >  (1/2  al)  we shall  have  a pooling  equilibrium  with  11 =  0 and
n2  =  (1  - a1) B (for S).
The  mixed  strategies  equilibrium  will take  place  in the  intern.ediate
range  (a2/2)  <  6  <  (1/2  a1) in which case S will set  =  (1  - P1) (1  - U1
and  r2  =  (1  - @2)  B,  where (1  - P1) is the probability of W setting
r  =  B and  a2 is  the  updated  reputation.  Note  that  in the  mixed  strategies
regime  S  will compromise  in  both  periods  and  this  is  more likely  to  occur  when
al is small. This  consideraticn  carries  over  with some  modifications  to the
multiperiod  case.  Hence  when initial  credibility  is  low  the  policy  maker
will have  to  compromise  the  zero  inflation  target  for  a large  proportion  of
his  planning  horizon. Throughout  this  range  S  will  have  to incur  the  cost
e 
of a negative surprise inflation (since  frt  =  a  t  +  (1 - at) B  while
*
It=  1t ],  but  this  is  still  the  preferable  course.23
The  foregoing theory can  explain two phenomena associated  with
stabilization  programs. First,  it explains  why the  policy  maker is  dri.ren  to
annouince  his inflation  target, since it is only in this way  that S can
materialize  his comparative  advantage. Secondly,  it shows  that it is  usually
not optimal  for the strong  policy  maker to follow  policies  which ignore  the
credibility  issue. For  example,  it is not optimal  for  S to stick  for  a long
period  to a policy  of a fixed  exchange  rate,  even  when the fundamentals  are
consistent  with  it. With  lack  of credibility,  an  adjustable  peg,  or  a crawling
peg,  will  do better.
5.  SIGNALLING  AND OVERADJUSTNENT
In the literature  on stabilization  $rograms,  we often  encounter  the
claim  that  in  order  to  reduce  inflationary  expectations,  the  authorities  should
make  in  the  early  stages  more  extreme  adjustments  than  those  required  under  full
credibility.  This  intuitive  notion  can  be given  a  more precise  content  in the
framework  of signalling  theory,  using  the standard  Barro-Gordon  model  of the
previous  section. In this  analysis,  we shall  follow  the  basic  formulation  of
Vickers  (1986)  with some  extensions  needed  for  the  issue  at hand.
Following  Vickers  (1986)  and  Torsten  and  Van  Wijnbergen  (1989),  let  us
consider  a different  formulation  for  inflationary  and  non-inflationary  policy
makers.  We assume  that  while both policy  makers  are not capable  of making
precommitments,  they  differ  in  their  tastes  regarding  inflation  and  unemployment.
The  8strong'  policy  maker  is  now  considered  to  be  the  one  who  is  relatively  more
averse  to inflation. Formally  we assume  Ss c  SW
Under  conditions  of full  information,  there  is no incentive  for any
policy  maker  to  deviate  from  his  discretionary  optimum  which  yields  1i=Pi  (i=S  W)24
for each period.  This is not necessarily  true, however,  under incomplete
information.
Consider  a two-period  model  where  the  objective  function  of the  policy
maker  is
Ui  =  -(a/2)Vli 2+bi(Wli-fel)+6(_(a/2)1 2i+bi(W 2ife 2)]  (25)
where  7ti  is  r  in  period  t  when the  policy  ma'ker  is  1. At this  stage,  the  only
modification  from  Vickers  is by allowing  the  time  preference  parameter  (6)  to
be less than unity.  The public  knows everything  about the policy  makers'
objectives  but  does  not  know  which  one  of them  is in office. The identity  of
the  policy  makers  may  not  be  directly  inferred  from  their  behavior  because  W  may
gain  by  mimicking  S. We denote  by  a1 the  initial  probability  that  S  is  in  power.
The  strategy  vector  of  S  is XS-(ls,12s)  and  that  of  W is  XW=(r 1w,W 2w).
Expectations  fie  are  formed  prior  to  period  1  while  re2  is formed  by the  public
on the  basis  of the  observed  r1 by  means  of a function  re 2(71)*  We denote  the
pair (1el,re 2(.)) by  1e.  Equilibrium  is  defined  as  a state  where  Xi maximizes
Ui given  we,  and  where  the  latter  is correct  given  Xi (i=S,W).
There  are  two  types  of equilibrium  - a 'separating  equilibrium"  where
the  types  are  reve&led  in  the  first  period  and  a 'pooling  equilibrium"  where  W
mimics  S  in the  first  period  so  that  the  public  cannot  tell  one  from  the  other.
In the second  period, the types are revealed  since there is no point in
mimicking.
Let  us consider  first  the separating  equilibrium  and its  relation  to
overadjustment.  Since  the  types  are  revealed  in the  first  period,  we have in25
equilibrium  f2i-Pi  (i-S,w)  and  Te21Pi  if the  type  revealed  in  the  first  period
is i.  Since  the  policy  makers  cannot  affect  the  public's  prior  the  former  can
consider  ire  as  a  parameter.  Given  that  f2i has  been  determined  in  the  foregoing
manner,  the  only free  variables  in  Ui are rli  and  We2.  Following  Vickers,  we
may draw indifference  curves  (IS  and Iw) relating  these  two variables  as in
Figure  2.  It  may  be noted  that  utility  increases  in the  downward  direction
since  a low  r  is always  preferred. To the  left  of Si,  Ii is rising  since
an increase  in 1i1  raises  utility  and  therefore e  has to rise  to  keep
utility  constant  (the  opposite  holds  for  tli >  Bi).  Note also  that  the  shape
of the  indifference  curves  is independent  of  ire  1
Under  full  information,  the  strategy  of the  players  is  rti=Pi  and  get
equals  Pi,  depending  on the  type  in office. These  strategies  are represented
by the points R  and Q.  The  strategies  are less clear vrder Imperfect
information,  since  in this  case it is  possible  that  W will mimic  S.  This  can
happen  if,  for  example,  S  chooses  fi  = PS  (with  ye2 =  Z) and  W can  be  mistaken
for  S. If  S sets  T,  =  k [and  this  point  (X1  = k,  re2 = PS) lies  somewhat  to the
left  of IW that  passes  through  Q],  then the  public  may infer  that  the  policy
maker  is S since  in this  case  W  will prefer  setting  ry=Pw  and  being  revealed.
Suppose  that the  public  expects  S to behave  in the  foregoing  manner.
We  may  then  describe  the  public's  expectation  function  re 2(f 1 ) as the  segmented
line AEGH.  This leads to.  a possible  separating  equilibrium  at E where S
maximizes  Us at the  point  E with XS=(k,PS)  and  W maximizes  UW by Xw=(PW,Pw).
Expectations  will  be  correct  in  the  sense  that  rel=alk+(l-a 1)PW  and  Te2=Pi  where
i  is the  type revealed  in the  first  period.26
Note  that  in equilibrium  S sets  w1  below  its  full  information  optimum
(OS)  so  as  to  make it  too  hard  for  W to  follow. Thus  S  overadiusts  in  order  to
reduce 9 fe 2. By doing  this,  S eliminates  the  negative  surprise  inflation  in
the  second  period,  but  it  still  faces  a  negative  surprise  inflation  in  the  first
period  (equal  to -(1-a 1)(PW-k)). In fact,  thas  larger  the overadjustment,  as
measured  by (Ps-k),  the larger  the  negative  surprise  inflation  in the first
period  will be.
In  this  setting,  S  is  motivated  to  overadjust  because  W  has  an  incentive
te  mimic  him 'n  an attempt  to reduce  ge 2. However,  if  W's  discount  factor  (5)
is  low,  the  incentive  to  mimic  will  diminish  and  so  will  the  need  to  overadjust.
In terms  of Figure  2, a reduction  in  6  will cause  the  indifference  curves  (of
both players)  to shrink  inward  so that the point E will move to the right,
reduring  the  amount  of overadjustment.  If 6  is sufficiently  small,  as in the
case  of the  dotted  indifference  curve,  then  separation  will  be  achieved  without
any  overadjustment  by S.  Thus,  paradoxically,  when  new governments  have  more
concern for the future,  the need of S to overadjust,  or to 'signal",  will
increase  because  its  "shadow"  (W)  has  a greater  incentive  to wimic.
It  may  be the  case  that  S  will  give  up signalling  altogether  because
the  benefit  from  reducing  inflationary  expectations  is  not  worth  the  sacrifice
of overadjustment.  In  this  case,  there  may  result  a pooling  equilibrium,  which
is  a  more  elusive  concept  than  the  separating  equilibrium.  Vickers  suggests  that
the former  is an unlikely  outcome  when some refinements  in the concept  of
equilibrium  are introduced. 10 We claim,  however,  that a pooling  equilibrium
(even  in its  refined  form)  is quite  likely  when the  reputation  of S is  high.
The  foregoing  analysis  presupposes  that  S  prefers  being  revealed  in  the
first  period  rather  than  accepting  the  possibility  of  continued  uncertainty  about27
his identity. However  this  presumption  may  not be  warranted,  in  which  case a
pooling  equilibrium  may  arise.
Let  us suppose  that  when the  public  remains  uncertain  about  the  type,
it  will set  e2'  Ba  +  (1  A  ) Bw '  , *hich  corresponds  to a  pooling
equilibrium  (in  which  case  a1 is  not  updated). For simplicity  let  us confine
the  analysis  to  three  possible  values  of 1r:  k, SS  and  SW in  Figure  2. We shall
have  a  pooling  equilibrium  when (a)  W  has  an incentive  to  mimic  S and  (b)  S  has
no incentive  to  deviate  from  the  proposed  value  of 1'.
Let  us  examine  whether  J1  = BS  can  be  a  possible  candidate  for  a  pooling
equilibrium  (ir.  which  case  we also  have r1  a S).  Note first  that  if  12
is  below  Z in Figure  2, in  which  case  the  proposed  equilibrium  is represented
by points  such  as H or N, then  W will have an incentive  to mimic S, so that
condition  (a)  is satisfied. It remains  to be seen  whether  S can  benefit  from
a shift  to  k (a  shift  by S to  3W can  be ignored).
Note  that  if  S  shifts  from  Bs to  k then  the  public  knows  that  this  move
could  not  have  been  made by  W since  any  point  with r 2> BS is inferior  to  M
or  N, from  W's  point  of  view.  S  may  therefore  count  on the  public  changing  its
expectations  f2rom  i  to  e= B  a(here  we apply  the  'intuitive  criterion"  for  off fro  2  s
equilibrium  beliefs,  as in  Cho  and  Kreps  (1987)).
Thus  the  question  becomes  whether  E is  preferred  by S to the  proposed
e pooling  equilibrium  (given  r1=  as).  The  answer  is  positive  for  point  N and
negative  for  H.  The  latter  case  will require  a 1 to  be sufficiently  large. It
follows  that  when initial  credibility  is sufficiently  high there  will be no
incentive  to  overadjust  ('a  respectable  person  is  not  required  to  go  out  his  way
to  prove  his  honesty').  This  lends  support  to  the  intuitive  notion  that  a  policy28
maker  who faces  severe  credibility  problems  should  make  an  effort  to  overadjust,
and  this  is  expected  from  him  by the  public.
6.  COMPROMISE  AND  OVERADJUSTHENT
In  the  last  two  sections  we indicated  two  opposing  influences  on  the
level  of  ri set  by  the  strong  policy  maker  under  incomplete  information.  If  the
latter policy maker  is  characterized  by  living up  to  his  commitments
(announcements)  then  the  fact  that  they  are  only  partially  believed  induces  him
to raise  r1 above  his full  information  optimum  (which  is zero inflation). In
this  way  he may  avoid  excessive  costs  in  terms  of  negative  surprise  inflation.
On the  other  hand,  if the  policy  maker is less  inflationary  in the ser.se  that
he is relatively  more averse  to inflation,  then  he may  be induced  to reduce  11
below  his full  information  optimum  (which  is  Ps).
What  happens  if  the  policy  maker  is  less  inflationary  according  to  both
criteria? Consider  for  example  a  separating  equilibrium,  so  that  the  types  are
revealed  in the  first  period. If  W does  not  have an incentive  to  mimic  S then
overadjustment  is  not  relevant  and  S  will  set lS  - (1  - 1) OS,  which  means  that
S  will compromise  by setting  11S  between  zero  and BS (but  not between  BS and
e
Since  S is revealed  in the  first  period  we shall  have  =  r2  =  0.
If however  W has an incentive  to  mimic  the foregoing  solution,  then,
in a separating  equilibrium,  S  will  have  to reduce  rjS  below  (1  - a1) BS, i.e.
S  will  have  to  behave  strategically.  In this  case  S  will  still  compromise  with29
respect  to  the  target  u1  - 0  but  will overadjust  relative  to (1  - al)  Bs.
7.  CONCLUDING  CONNENTS
One of the  implications  of part I is that  the same  degree  of fiscal
needs  may result  in  widely  different  long-term  levels  of inflation  under  rules
or discretion. This  suggests  that  if  the  policy  maker  can  convince  the  public
that (even  though  he intends  to rely  on money finance)  he will not resort  to
tactics  of surprise  inflation,  the  long  term  level  of inflatior.  may  be reduced
considerably.  The  policy  maker  would then  be advised  to limit  the  deviations
of  his  nominal  anchor  from  the  preannounced  target. This  applies  equally  well
to  monetary  and  exchange  rate  rules. If  a  change  in  the  target  is  required,  it
should  be carried  out  with  minimal  surprise  effects.
An example  of the latter  kind of policy  was observed  in the recent
Israeli  stabilization  where  the  government  avoided  the  implementation  of maxi-
devaluation  without  reaching  prior  agreement,  or  understanding,  with the  trade
unions.  This kind of behavior  was aimed  at reducing  the suspicion  that the
government  intends  to use  surprise  inflation  tactics  which  call  for  preemptive
steps  by labor.
An important  implication  of part II is that in the beginning  of a
stabilization  program,  even a policy  maker  who is not able to persist  with
stabilization  will enjoy  credibility  because  there  may not be a clear  way to
identify  his  true  nature. This  may  explain  why  we often  observe  that  heterodox
stabilization  programs  (based  on initial  wage-price  freezes  and  pegging  of the
exchange  rate)  are  very effective  in the initial  stage  in reducing  inflation
drastically  without  appreciable  social  cost  in  terms  of  unemployment.  However,
the  credibility  theory  described  earlier  explains  why the  difficulties  in the30
form  of  overvaluation  and  so  on,  will arise  in the  flexibilization  stages  even
for  the  policy  maker  who  pursues  the  stabilization  effort  relentlessly.
What should  a  ostrong"  policy  maker do when he is confronted  with
credibility  problems  along  the  way?  If the  source  of tie  problem  lies in the
inability  of the 'weak'  policy  maker to honor  his commitment  then the strong
policy  maker  will find  it  optimal  to  compromise  to some  extent  (depending  on  his
initial  credibility)  with  adverse  expectations.  In  this  way  he  may  mitigate  the
excessive  recessionary  effect  which  were  encountered,  for  example,  in  the  Chilean
tablita  policy  (which  was supported  by a fiscal  surplus).
On the  other  hand,  when the  main  source  of credibility  problems  stems
from  different  attitudes  of --- 'icy  makers  toward  the  relative  importance  of  price
stability  versus  distortion  in the real  sector  (overvaluation,  unemployment).
and in the incentives  of the high inflation  policy  maker to mimic the low
inlation  policy  maker  then  a case  can  be  made for  an initial  overadjustment  by
the  less  inflationary  policy  maker. This  is  especially  true  when  the  credibility
of the  latter  policy  maker  is  low.
In our  earlier  analysis,  the overadjustment  took  the form  of setting
an excessively  low  inflation  target  by the less-inflationary  policy  maker in
order  to make it more difficult  for  his imitator  to follow.  However,  more
generally,  the overadjustment  may take the form of running  fiscal  surpluses.
drastic  cuts  in  governmental  expenditures  and  tough  wage  policies. Quite  often
overadjustment  is  essential  to signal  that  a change  of regime  has  taken  place.
Without  the recognition  of this change  the future  costs  of stabilization  may
become  too  hard to  bear.31
FOOTNOTES
1  Assuming  we begin  at a steady  state,  with  1 e  iewe  have
ft - (Ht  - M _,)/Mt  -1- 
2  This  is reflected,  for  example,  by a reduction  in real  balances.
3  Here  we  make  use  of the  assumption  (8 2Q/8r 2)<0. The  claim  in the  text  can
be established  rigorously  by  making  use  of the  specific  form  of  Q in (5).
4  The  slope  of the  indifference  curve  in  Figure  1  will  now  be
OSj8r-(#'-baD)8Gl,  which  is flatter  than  before.
5  The  treatment  of  credibility  in  an  infinite  horizon  framework  in  the  Barro-
Gordon  models  ran  into  the  problem  that  equilibrium  is  not unique,  which
results  from different  possibilities  of the public's  reaction  to the
government's  deviation  from  the  rule.
6  In Barro's  model,  we is constant  in the  second  interval.
7  If the  policy  maker  happens  to be  W, then  he will  be indifferent,  in the
second  interval,  between  revealing  himself  (playing  1-b/a)  and  mimicking.
8  One  could  argve  alternatively*as  follows. Since  in equilibrium
JT  aT 1T +  (l - aT)  B  where  FT is  the  optimal  announcement  by S,
as the  public  perceives  it,  we my  ask  ourselves  the  following
question:  what is  the  value  of rT  that  S  would  prefer  most to  be
the  public's  perception  of  his  optimal  announcement?  This  must
clearly  lead  to (24). Consequently  the  public  expects  S to  make
this  announcement.  W  who realizes  these  considerations  will  also
prefer  to announce  (24). Hence (24)  is the  unique  equilibrium
announcement.
9  More precisely,  in  order  to  make sure  that  te2 will  not  exceed  Ps.
10  The  refinement  is  essentially  that  S should  not  prefer  a  separating  option
to  the  pooling  equilibrium.32
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